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Abstract
Risk assessment is a major challenge for supply chain managers, as it potentially affects
business factors such as service costs, supplier competition and customer expectations. The
increasing interconnectivity between organisations has put into focus methods for supply chain
cyber risk management. We introduce a general approach to support such activity taking
into account various techniques of attacking an organisation and its suppliers, as well as the
impacts of such attacks. Since data is lacking in many respects, we use structured expert
judgment methods to facilitate its implementation. We couple a family of forecasting models
to enrich risk monitoring. The approach may be used to set up risk alarms, negotiate service
level agreements, rank suppliers and identify insurance needs, among other management
possibilities.
Keywords Cybersecurity · Risk Analysis · Supply Chain Risks · Expert Judgment
1 Introduction
Earthquakes, economic crises, strikes, terrorist attacks and other events may disrupt supply chain operations
with significant impact over the performance of organisations and the availability of their products and/or
services. As examples, it is reported that Ericsson lost 400 million EUR after their supplier’s semiconductor
plant caught on fire in 2000 (Latour, 2001) and that Apple lost many customer orders during a supply
shortage of DRAM chips after an earthquake in Taiwan in 2016 (Lovejoy, 2016).
Supply chain risk management (SCRM) has come into place to implement strategies to manage risks in
a supply chain with the goal of reducing vulnerabilities and avoid service and product disruptions. As
in other risk analysis application areas, SCRM usually involves four processes: identification, assessment,
controlling and monitoring of risks (Bedford and Cooke, 2001). Tang and Tomlin (2008) define the field
as the management of risks through coordination or collaboration among supply chain partners to ensure
profitability and continuity. They consider four basic impact mitigation areas: supply, demand, product and
information management. Ritchie and Brindley (2007) develop a framework that categorizes risk drivers
and integrates risks dimensions in supply chains. Sharland et al. (2003), Ju¨ttner (2005) and Zsidisin and
Ritchie (2008) identify key issues in SCRM through surveys, presenting best practices. Hallikas et al. (2004)
propose a risk management process in network environments giving a more holistic view through a risk
matrix approach, although this type of tool has important shortcomings (Cox, 2008). Thekdi and Santos
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(2016) introduce dependencies through an input-output model across multiple sectors to assess the social
and economic factors associated with SCRM. Kern et al. (2012) illustrate how supply chains would benefit
from the capacity of predicting service unavailability early enough, so as to mitigate interruptions. Foerstl
et al. (2010), Bandaly et al. (2012) and Ghadge et al. (2013) develop frameworks that cover identification,
assessment, response management and performance outcomes. Curkovic et al. (2015) identify how companies
may manage supply chain risks through FMEA. Heckmann et al. (2015) determine the core characteristics
for supply-chain risk understanding, focusing on the definition of supply chain risk and related concepts such
as objective-driven risk, risk exposition, disruptive triggers and risk attitude. Fahimnia et al. (2015) present
a review of quantitative methods for SCRM, which are expanding rapidly in the field. Aqlan and Lam (2016)
and Fattahi et al. (2017) use optimization and simulation to deal with deterministic and stochastic features
in SCRM. Qazi et al. (2017) capture dependence between risks and risk mitigation strategies using Bayesian
Belief Networks. Zahiri et al. (2017) and Song and Zhuang (2017) are recent examples of areas where SCRM
has a major impact in real applications. Finally, the role of humans in supply chains is reviewed in Perera
et al. (2018).
Due to the proliferation of cyber attacks and the increasing interconnectivity of organisations, a major issue
of recent interest refers to new cyber threats affecting supply chain operations in what we shall call Supply
Chain Cyber Risk Management (SCCRM). As an example, Target suffered in 2013 a major cyber breach
through their air conditioning supplier losing up to 70 million credit and debit cards of buyers, with massive
reputational damage (McGrath, 2014). Another relevant attack was Wannacry which took over, among
many others, Telefonica and the UK NHS producing the unavailability of numerous services, entailing costs
estimated to have reached $4 billion (Berr, 2016).
We present here a framework for SCCRM. Section 2 presents a general description, covering models to
forecast attacks and their impacts and integrating such information to provide relevant risk indicators. Due
to lack of data, we need to rely on expert judgment to assess the involved parameters. Section 3 outlines its
implementation. Section 4 covers a numerical example. We end up with some discussion in Section 5.
2 A Framework for SCCRM based on Expert Judgment
Consider a company c interconnected with its suppliers s, pertaining to a set S. Both the company and
the suppliers are subject to various types of attacks a ∈ A. Examples include attacks through botnets or
based on stolen login information. Attacks to a supplier could be transferred to the company. As an example,
imagine a case in which one of the company’s suppliers is infected through malware; the attacker could then
scan the supplier’s network and send attacking emails to the company, which would be more likely to get
infected as the received software originates from a legitimate source.
We have access to a threat intelligence system (TIS) (Tittel, 2017) which collects data nac , nas , s ∈ S,
respectively from the company and its suppliers, in connection with various attack vectors a. The data
could include, e. g., the IPs of botnet infected devices or the number of malware infections found. The TIS
provides also data about the security environment (including, for instance, the number of negative mentions
in hacktivist blogs), and the security posture (covering for example the patch cadence or the number of
vulnerabilities). Based on such data, and other available information, we aim at assessing:
• the probabilities that the company’s suppliers are attacked;
• the probability that the company is attacked, either directly or through its suppliers;
• the impacts that such attacks might induce over the company.
We shall then aggregate such information to facilitate the cyber risk assessment to the company in relation
with its suppliers so as to support supply chain cyber risk management decisions.
We describe a general approach to obtain, combine and apply in practice the required model ingredients.
Given the reluctance of organizations to provide data concerning sufficiently harmful attacks for reputational
reasons, we deal with the eventual lack of data to fit the proposed models by extracting information from
cybersecurity specialists through structured expert judgment techniques (Cooke, 1991; O’Hagan et al., 2006).
Here, the term “sufficiently harmful” indicates that the attack is relevant in the sense of having caused
significant damage to the company and/or its suppliers1.
1For example, this could correspond to attacks that need to be declared to a supervisory authority, as in the recent
General Data Protection Regulation, EU (2018).
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2.1 Probability of a Sufficiently Harmful Attack
We start by describing how to estimate the probability that the supplier, or the company, is successfully
attacked, given the information scanned through the TIS. For the moment, we do not include the security
environment and posture in the model for expositional simplicity, which we cover in Section 2.2. We undertake
the proposed approach for each attack type a ∈ A.
The attack probability is modeled through
Pr(y = 1 | β,n) = g(f(β,n))
where y = 1 indicates that the attack was successful; n represents the data available, β are parameters
and f : Rh → R and g : R→ [0, 1] are invertible functions, where h is the number of severity levels of the
corresponding attack vector. For example, if the security event is related to malware attacks, we could have
three severity levels: n1 (low level, the malware does not seem potentially harmful); n2 (medium level, the
malware could cause damage); and n3 (high level, the malware is potentially very harmful). The function f
should satisfy the condition f(β,n) = 0 if n = 0. Finally, to limit the number of questions to be posed to the
experts, we also require the function f to be separable, in the sense
f(β,n) =
h∑
i=1
fi(βi, ni).
The parameters will be indirectly estimated through expert judgment, for which we provide appropriate
questions and consistency checks. We use interactive elicitation techniques (Clemen and Reilly, 1999) to
assess from experts, for example, the probability p
∧
i given the data n so that
p
∧
i = Pr(y = 1 | βi, ni) = g(fi(βi, ni)), (1)
We then make
βˆi = f−1i (g−1(p
∧
i), ni)). (2)
Since f is separable, we only need one question per parameter βi.
Among many other possibilities, a choice for the functions f and g are provided by the logistic regression
model (Hosmer et al., 2013), that is, f(β,n) = β ·n and g(x) = 1/(1 + exp(−x)). It is common to add a bias
term β0, so the total number of parameters would be h+ 1. We illustrate next how to obtain the parameters
given the attack probabilities for this specific case in which
Pr(y = 1 | β,n) = 11 + exp(−(β0 + β · n)) , (3)
where n = (n1, . . . , nh) is the attack vector and, finally, β = (β1, . . . , βh) are the parameters.
We thus ask the expert to assess the attack probability when n = 0, and, as in (1),
p
∧
0 = Pr(y = 1 | β0,β,n = [0, . . . , 0]) =
1
1 + exp(−β0) .
A typical question that could be posed to an expert in this case is:
Assume that the TIS has detected no evidence in the network concerning such infection (i.e.,
ni = 0, i = 1, . . . , h). What would be the probability p0 of actually suffering a sufficiently
harmful attack due to such type of infection?
We then solve for β0, as in (2), to obtain
β
∧
0 = log
(
p
∧
0
1− p∧0
)
.
Next, we assess through expert judgment
p
∧
1 = Pr(y = 1 | β0,β,n = [1, 0, . . . , 0]) =
1
1 + exp(−(β0 + β1)) ,
obtaining
β
∧
1 = log
(
p
∧
1
1− p∧1
)
− β
∧
0.
3
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We would extract p
∧
i from the experts in a similar manner to obtain β
∧
i, i = 2, . . . , h. Finally, we would check
for consistency using assessments such as, e. g.,
p
∧
= Pr(y = 1 | β0,β,n = [2, 0, . . . , 0]),
and checking whether
log
(
p
∧
1− p∧
)
' β
∧
0 + 2β
∧
1.
If not, we would need to reassess some of the judgments, modifing the parameters accordingly.
Besides the attack probabilities, for the case of suppliers we also need to assess the probability qa of a type a
attack being transferred from the supplier to the company. We define an attack to a supplier as transferred
successfully if it is immediately followed by a second attack to the company, taking advantage from either the
information gathered in the first attack or the compromised infrastructure. The probabilities of transferring
an attack are different for each of the atta types. Therefore, we elicit them directly from the experts. An
example of a typical question for assessing such probabilities, in relation e. g., with malware, would be
Suppose that there is an attack to a supplier based on malware. What would be the probability
of the customer suffering another one, taking advantage of the supplier’s attack?
As before, we introduce consistency checks and interactive procedures to evaluate such assessment. We
assume that the probabilities are the same for every supplier, considering that all suppliers are equivalent in
that respect, thus reducing the cognitive load over the experts and avoiding raising the number of questions
posed to them.
2.2 Taking into Account the Security Environment and Posture
We describe now how we incorporate information about the security environment and posture of the supplier
and the company within the attack probabilities. Essentially, we introduce indices for the corresponding
variables through multicriteria value functions (Gonza´lez-Ortega et al., 2018) and then apply the approach in
Section 2.1 to extract the required coefficients.
We define first an index e which assesses the security environment of, say, the supplier based on the k
environment variables captured by the TIS. Let ei be the i-th variable, i = 1, . . . , k, rescaled to [0, 1]. With
no loss of generality, assume that the bigger ei is, the worse is the precieved security environment. We use
a multicriteria linear value function, e˜ =
∑k
i=1 λiei with
∑k
i=1 λi = 1, λi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , k. We determine
the λi weights by asking experts to compare pairs of security environment contexts leading to a system of
equations
δ11λ1 = δ21λ2,
...
δ1k−1λk−1 = δ2k−1λk.
(4)
For instance, given a reference value δ11 for the first environment variable, we obtain the first equation by
asking the expert about the value δ21 of the second environment variable such that the following two security
environments are perceived as equally unsafe by the expert
(δ11 , 0, . . . , 0) ∼ (0, δ21 , . . . , 0).
As an example, given that δ11 = 0.7, the expert answer could be δ21 = 0.3, leading to the equation 0.7λ1 = 0.3λ2.
As before, we introduce interactive schemes to obtain the δi’s and perform consistency checks.
Then, from system (4), we obtain the k − 1 equations
λi =
δ1i−1
δ2i−1
λi−1 = ri−1λi−1, i = 2, . . . , k,
with
ri = δ1i /δ2i , i = 1, . . . , k − 1.
Taking into account that
∑k
i=1 λi = 1, we solve for λ1 to obtain
λ1
(
1 +
k−1∑
i=1
i∏
j=1
rj
)
= 1,
4
Assessing Supply Chain Cyber Risks Preprint
so that
λ1 =
1
1 +
∑k−1
i=1
∏i
j=1 rj
,
and
λi =
i−1∏
j=1
rjλ1, i = 2, . . . , k.
We proceed in a similar manner to aggregate the security posture, defining an index l and assessing such
posture through a linear multicriteria value function
l˜ =
∑
i
vili,
with
∑
i vi = 1 and vi ≥ 0 ∀i, where li is the i-th security posture variable, conveniently scaled.
Once we have built the environment and posture value functions, we assess the corresponding β parameters.
We adopt common parameters for all attack types. For example, for the specific case of a harmful attack with
h levels of infection, we just extend the attack vector n˜ = [n, l˜, e˜], where [a,b] denotes the concatenation of
vectors a and b, and plug it into equation (1) or (3).
Then, we set a reference value for l˜, say v1, which we associate with l = [1, 0, . . . , 0] and ask about the
corresponding probability p
∧
h+1, when, e. g., ni = 1, i = 1, . . . , h and e˜ = 0. For the specific case with the
logistic regression model, equation (3) becomes
p
∧
h+1 =
1
1 + exp(−(β0 + β11 + · · ·+ βh1 + βh+1v1 + βh+20)) ,
and, similarly, in the general one. Since we have already elicited β
∧
0, β
∧
1, . . . , β
∧
h, Section 2.1, we easily obtain
β
∧
h+1, through
β
∧
h+1 =
1
v1
(
log
(
p
∧
h+1
1− p∧h+1
)
−
h∑
i=1
β
∧
i
)
.
We proceed similarly to obtain βh+2, introducing the corresponding consistency checks.
As mentioned, we implement this approach for all attack types, both for the company and its suppliers.
2.3 Impacts over the company and its suppliers
We describe the models used to predict the impacts of attacks over the company. The relevant impacts might
vary across the organisation. In our supply chain application area we have included: the suppliers’ service
unavailabilities, as they would induce a cost in the company due to lacking such service; the company’s
service unavailability, which would also induce a cost, typically, higher than the earlier ones; and, finally, the
loss of company reputation which might induce, in turn, a loss of customers. We use the same distributions
for all attack types. Hubbard and Seiersen (2016) discuss how to measure other impacts potentially relevant
in cybersecurity.
2.3.1 Supplier and Company Unavailability
We focus first on supplier and company service unavailability, given a sufficiently harmful attack. Their
durations will be designated by is and ic, respectively. We model the corresponding downtimes through
non-negative parametric distributions
f(is | θs) ∼ P (θs); f(ic | θc) ∼ P (θc).
Given the lack of data, we aim at obtaining estimates of the parameters through expert judgment. For this,
we ask the experts for several quantiles q = (q1, . . . , qn) of the corresponding distributions and estimate the
parameters θ by solving
min
θ
||q − cdfP (p, θ)||22,
where cdfP (·, θ) designates the cumulative distribution function of the distribution P with parameters θ. This
leads to the corresponding optimal parameters θ∗. As an example, if the distribution had two parameters, we
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could use two quantiles, say the first and third quartiles, with p = [0.25, 0.75]. As before, we also perform
consistency checks based on other quantiles and use interactive procedures to obtain the involved quantiles.
When required, we may approximate the downtimes through the expected value of the distributions
i¯s = E[f(is | θ∗s)]; i¯c = E[f(ic | θ∗c)].
We undertake this approach for all the suppliers and the company.
2.3.2 Reputation
We consider now the impact of an attack over the company’s reputation. We assume that reputational
impacts occur only if there is a direct attack to the company. There is no natural attribute that allows us
to assess reputation loss, see the discussion in Hubbard and Seiersen (2016). Our focus is therefore in its
business consequence which we consider to be the loss in market share induced by a harmful attack over the
organisation.
Let us designate by d the proportion of customers abandoning to a competitor due to the incumbent loss of
reputation, which we model as a parametric distribution with support in [0, 1]. We proceed in a similar fashion
to Section 2.3.1, by asking several quantiles to experts and, subsequently, approximating the parameters based
on a least squares cdf approximation, after appropriate consistency checks. When required, the expected
proportion of customers lost could be approximated through the expected value.
2.3.3 Aggregating Impacts
We describe now how we aggregate all relevant impacts over the company. For such purpose, we would
require τ , the market share for the company; η, the (monetary) market size; and κs and κc, the cost per hour
of supplier and company service unavailability, respectively. We may assess them from data and/or experts.
First, we compute the downtime cost of the supplier s and company c after a sufficiently harmful attack
through
cis = κs × is,
cic = κc × ic.
On the other hand, the reputational cost after a successful attack is approximated through the cost associated
with clients abandoning the company, which would be
cd = d× τ × η.
Recall now that there are three types of attacks:
1. Direct attacks to the company. The cost in this case is c = cd + cic .
2. Attacks to the supplier that disrupt its service but are not transferred to the company. Their costs
are c = cis .
3. Attacks to the supplier that disrupt its service and are transferred to the company. The cost would
be c = cd + cic + cis .
To cater for the company’s risk attitude, we may use a constant risk averse utility model (Gonza´lez-Ortega
et al., 2018),
u(c) = (1− e−ρc)/ρ,
where ρ is extracted from experts within the company, as there explained.
When necessary, we shall use the expected costs
c¯is = κs × i¯s, c¯ic = κc × i¯c, c¯d = d¯× τ × η.
2.4 Model Outputs
We derive now the model outputs that may be relevant for risk management, including attack probabilities,
expected impacts and expected utilities.
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2.4.1 Attack Probabilities
For the incumbent company and its suppliers, recall that the probability of a type a ∈ A security event
resulting in a sufficiently harmful attack is
pai = Pr(y = 1 | βa,nai ) = g(f(βa,nai )), (5)
where nai represents the count for the attack vector a, including the environment and posture indicators,
and i ∈ {c, s} (c is the company and s a supplier). Assuming that the attack types are independent, the
probability of a direct attack to the company will be approximated through
APc =
KA∑
k=1
∑
I∈CA,k
∏
a∈I
pac
∏
a∈A\I
(1− pac )
 ,
where CA,k is the set of all possible combinations of k elements taken from A and KA ≤ |A| is the maximum
number of simultaneous attacks taken into account. A typical value for this parameter would be 3, as very
rarely organisations are simultaneously attacked through more than three vectors (Smith-Bingham, 2014).
For each supplier s ∈ S, we approximate the induced attack probability from s to c through
IAPsc =
KA∑
k=1
∑
I∈CA,k
[(∏
a∈I
pas
∏
a∈A\I
(1− pas)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Probability of direct attack
(
1−
(
1−
∏
a∈I
(1− qa)
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Probability of transferred attack
]
,
recalling that qa is the probability of an attack of type a being transferred from s to c.
Finally, we approximate the global attack probability to the company through
GAPc ' APc + (1−APc)
KS∑
k=1
∑
I∈CS,k
∏
s∈I
IAPsc
∏
s∈S\I
(1− IAPsc)
 , (6)
where S is the set of all suppliers of the company c and KS ≤ |S| is the maximum number of suppliers that
can reasonably transfer an attack over the same time period. In (6), we observe that when an attack is direct
to the company it supersedes the indirect attacks as its consequences will be typically much more important.
2.4.2 Risk Measures: Expected Impacts of Attacks
Recall that we are assuming that if an attack is successfully transferred from a supplier, there are unavailability
and reputational costs, whereas if the attack is not transferred, we only consider supplier unavailability costs.
We now approximate the expected impacts.
The first one refers to the expected impact due to direct attacks to the company, and is expressed as
Rc = APc(c¯d × c¯is).
The impact induced through attacks to the supplier s is specified as
IRsc =
KA∑
k=1
∑
I∈CA,k
{(∏
a∈I
pas
∏
a∈A\I
(1− pas)
)[ Attack not transferred︷ ︸︸ ︷(
1−
∏
a∈I
(1− qa)
)
(c¯is) +(
1−
(
1−
∏
a∈I
(1− qa)
))
(c¯d + c¯ic + c¯is)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Attack transferred
]}
.
Finally, the total impact would be
TRc = Rc +
∑
s∈S
IRsc.
In a similar fashion, we may consider approximations to expected utilities replacing the previous impacts by
the corresponding utilities.
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2.5 Forecasting Risk Indicators
The previous approach is used periodically over time based on collecting data through the TIS and aggregating
the results to assess supply chain cyber risks. As a relevant complement, observe that the proposed approach
focuses on studying several risk indicators Xj (attack probabilities, expected impacts, expected utilities)
to monitor SCCR at the company, in reference to time j. The ensuing analysis focuses on just one of the
indicators, but applies to all of them. Dj represents the data available until time j. Xj+1|Dj represents a
forecasting model for the risk index at time j + 1 and summarises all information available at time period j
concerning such index.
We employ Dynamic Linear Models (DLMs) to support forecasting tasks in risk monitoring. We briefly
sketch the basic DLM results we use. For further details, see West and Harrison (2013) and Petris et al.
(2009). We adopt the general, normal DLM with univariate observations Xj , characterised by the quadruple
{Fj , Gj , Vj ,Wj}, where, for each j, Fj is a known vector of dimension m× 1, Gj is a known m×m matrix,
Vj is a known variance, and Wj is a known m×m variance matrix. The model is written as
θ0|D0 ∼ N(m0, C0),
θj |θj−1 ∼ N(Gjθj−1,Wj),
Xj |θj ∼ N(F ′jθj , Vj).
Because of the relative stability of the type of series considered, for modelling purposes we use a trend (second
order polynomial) DLM which is a constant Fj and Gj specification with
F = [ 1 0 ] and G =
[
1 1
0 1
]
.
West and Harrison (2013) summarise the basic features of DLMs for forecasting purposes that we use. They
are based on the one-step ahead predictive distributions which, for each j, have normal distribution
Xj |Dj−1 ∼ N(fj , Qj),
with mean fj and variance Qj recursively defined. k-steps ahead forecasts are also based on normal models
and will also be used below.
2.6 Uses
We sketch the main uses of the above outputs which facilitate the implementation of supply chain cyber risk
management strategies.
Risk monitoring As Kern et al. (2012) illustrate, predicting supply chain disruptions well in advance
greatly benefit operations. Indeed, a major activity in operational risk management refers to monitoring risk
levels and advice sufficiently in advance on when potentially dangerous situations might arise.
We base risk monitoring on the above mentioned forecasting models. For this, we use the point forecasts
at time j for the risk indicator given by E[Xj |Dj−1] = fj and the interval forecasts determined by [lj =
fj − z1−α/2Q1/2j , uj = fj + z1−α/2Q1/2j ], where uj and lj respectively represent the upper and lower bounds
of the interval; z1−α/2 is the 1 − α/2 quantile of the standard normal distribution; and, finally, α is the
desired probability level of the predictive interval. We then issue an alarm about an unexpected increase, or
decrease, in the incumbent risk indicator when the corresponding next observation xj does not fall in the
predictive interval [lj , uj ]. If xj > uj , the risk seems much worse than expected possibly flagging an issue; if
xj < lj , the risk is better than expected suggesting possibly improved security practices. Should this happen
repeatedly over time, the alarm could be modulated to accordingly increase awareness.
Another type of monitoring alarms may be raised when the predictive interval captures a sufficiently high risk
level y. For this, we perform predictions k steps ahead based on standard DLM forecasting results to try to
forecast sufficiently in advance critical risk issues. For example, we may try to detect whether Pr(Xj+k ≥ y)
will be sufficiently high for a certain k and, if so, raise a warning.
Supplier relations management Another important activity in SCRM refers to managing relations with
suppliers. A key issue relates with ranking suppliers. For this purpose, we may consider the induced risks,
the induced expected impacts or the induced attack probabilities of various suppliers over the company. For
8
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example, we could say that supplier s1 is preferred to supplier s2 if its induced expected impact is smaller, that
is, if IRs1c ≤ IRs2c . This supports identifying and dealing with riskier suppliers for communication purposes,
increasing transparency and forecasting critical situations. As a result of this process we may choose between
the less risky of two suppliers which provide the same service or product with similar cost. This also serves
to setup benchmarks between different groups of suppliers.
Another important supplier relations management activity refers to negotiations of service level agreements
(SLA) between the company and a supplier of its choice. Using the same indices as before, SLAs could be
based on the company requiring the supplier to preserve its induce risk indicator Xj to remain below a certain
maximum level mj , as well as requiring the supplier, possibly through a third party, to monitor and forecast
whether such maximum acceptable level has been or will be attained. For example, the company could require
the supplier to preserve IRsc ≤ m, over time. Repeated violations of the agreed maximum risk level could
lead to a contract breach and a penalty, thus incentivising a supplier into better managing cybersecurity.
Cyber insurance The above risk measures allow us to properly apportion the cyber risks to which a
company is subject to, including those related with third parties, thus facilitating the negotiation of insurance
contracts, both with the suppliers and an insurer, as well as introducing new dynamic insurance contracts.
For example, the company could apply for an insurance premium reduction if TRc is preserved below a
certain agreed level throughout a year; or we could define a, say, weekly premium, based on the dynamic
assessment of the level of various risk indicators. The SLA mechanisms described earlier may be seen also as
an insurance mechanism between the company and its suppliers.
3 Implementation
We describe how we implement the proposed approach and couple it with a commercially available TIS.
Essentially, we first calibrate several experts concerning their cybersecurity knowledge. Then we obtain their
judgments and combine them to obtain the corresponding parameters. Finally, during operation, we assess
attack probabilities and risks, issue alarms if required and forecast risks for the next periods. This entails
some data preprocessing.
3.1 Security Expert Calibration
We obtain judgments from m experts which we calibrate using Cooke’s (1991) classical model. We first ask
the experts several general questions related with cyber security. As an example, one of the questions we
used is:
Which was the number of new ransomware types over the last year?
The experts’ answers describe the intervals that, they believe, cover with high probability the value, as well
as their median. Based on such assessments, we obtain the expert scores (ωi)mi=1, ωi ≥ 0,
∑m
i=1 ωi = 1.
3.2 Security Expert Assessment. Generic Questions
Once we have calibrated the experts, we extract the relevant attack probabilities through a questionnaire,
based on hypothetical scenarios in which sufficiently harmful attacks may occur. For example, one of the
questions referring to a scenario pertaining to a botnet based type of attack was:
According to you, what would be the probability of actually suffering a sufficiently harmful
attack through botnet infected devices if the TIS did not detect any of them in the company’s
network?
The i-th expert provides a probability pi for the corresponding question, which we aggregate through
p =
m∑
i=1
ωipi,
with the weights defined above. Based on this type of assessments we obtain the β parameters, covering the
stages described in Sections 2.1 and 2.2.
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3.3 Company Expert Assessment. Specific Questions
We then extract the specific parameters which refer to impacts to the company (direct or through the supplier)
with a questionnaire. These parameters include, among others, the current market share, the market size, or
the expected number of customers lost after a successful attack. Some of them will be based on available
data; for others, we could ask experts as described above. For instance, a question we used is:
According to you, what would be the average cost of one hour of service unavailability of such
supplier?
In such a way, we cover the issues described in Section 2.3.
3.4 Data Preprocessing
The data received through the TIS are preprocessed via exponential smoothing, Brown (2004). This allows
us to control the growth rate of various security indicators and partly mitigate fluctuations associated with
random variations. Given {xj}, the raw data sequence, rj will represent the security indicator at time j, and
h the smoothing factor through
r0 = x0, rj = h× xj + (1− h)rj−1.
Observe that
rj = h× xj + (1− h)hxj−1 + · · ·+ (1− h)k−2hxj−(k−1) + (1− h)khrj−k.
Since (1− h)k∗ will be small enough for k∗ sufficiently large, we have
rj '
k∗∑
i=0
h(1− h)ixj−i,
which effectively entails preserving the last k∗ scans (xj , xj−1, . . . , xj−k∗) and consolidating them in rj .
3.5 Operation
With the above information, we are capable of putting the proposed approach under operation. We summarise
first all the required information, after having calibrated the experts:
1. The coefficients λ, v, and β are obtained (indirectly) from the experts as in Sections 2.1, 2.2 and 3.2.
2. The probability qa of each attack type transferring from the supplier to the customer is obtained
directly from the experts as described in Section 2.1.
3. The information needed to compute the downtime costs of the company and supplier, cc and cs,
must be provided by the company. This involves assessing every supplier s to obtain estimates of its
downtime distribution is, as well as ic.
4. The information needed to compute the reputational cost cd is obtained from experts within the
company.
Once we have those parameters, we may start operations by essentially scanning through the TIS, performing
the risk computations, updating the forecasting models and issuing alarms if required. The suppliers and
company data obtained periodically by scanning the network through the TIS are preprocessed, Section 3.4.
In summary, at every time step j we perform the following computations:
1. Scan the network through the TIS in search for attack, posture and environment vectors n, e and l,
for the company and its suppliers.
2. Preprocess the data (exponential smoothing and scaling).
3. Assess the attack probabilities APc, IAPsc and GAPc.
4. Assess the risks Rc, IRsc and TRc.
5. Issue alarms, if required.
6. Display risk outputs.
7. Compute risk forecasts for next periods, as required.
We sketch next a numerical example using simulated data.
10
Assessing Supply Chain Cyber Risks Preprint
4 A Numerical Example
Assume that we scan information regarding four attack vectors, |A| = 4. For the first security vector, one
expert provided attack probabilities p
∧
0 = 0.05, when the scan did not detect any infected devices, and
p
∧
1 = 0.25, when the scan detected 1% of infected devices in the company’s network. Then, using the basic
logistic regression model, we obtain
β
∧
0 = log
(
p
∧
0
1− p∧0
)
= −2.94,
and
β
∧
1 = log
(
p
∧
1
1− p∧1
)
− β
∧
0 = 1.85.
If we detect now that 0.075% of the devices are actually infected at t = 1, we estimate the attack probability
of that specific security event at
pc =
1
1 + exp(2.94− 1.85× 0.075) = 0.057.
We show in Table 1, columns 1-3, the probabilities of each of the security events for the company and two of
its suppliers s1 and s2. These probabilities are obtained through equation (3), as demonstrated above for the
company and the first security event. We also show in the fourth column the probability of an attack being
transferred from a supplier to the company for the four vectors.
pc ps1 ps2 q
atk0 0.057 0.468 0.383 0.103
atk1 0.187 0.164 0.350 0.107
atk2 0.131 0.166 0.143 0.056
atk3 0.236 0.481 0.200 0.084
Table 1: Probabilities of successful attack for four attack types (company, supplier 1, supplier 2, transfer)
Given the above, we compute the direct attack probability to the company over the next period, AP = 0.491;
the attack probabilities induced by the suppliers IAP1 = 0.111, IAP2 = 0.098; and, finally, the global attack
probability, GAP = 0.592. Clearly having two suppliers increases the chances for the company of receiving
attacks. Should both suppliers offer the same service, say, both were Internet providers, we could take into
account their IAPs to decide whether to contract the services from one or the other. In the example, we
might be more inclined to work with the second supplier as it seems less likely to receive an attack through it.
We transform the previous probabilities into expected costs, assuming the following information: the average
cost per hour of downtime of our company is 20k EUR; the market size is 2922 billion EUR; and, finally, the
current market share of the company is 18%. In addition, the company estimates that one hour of service
unavailability of both suppliers costs 25k EUR. The first and third quartiles for the downtime distributions
are 2 and 6 hours for the company, and 1 and 4 hours for the suppliers. Finally, the first and third quartiles
for the distribution of the proportion of lost customers after a successful attack are assessed as 0.01 and 0.05
With the previous information, using the procedure in Section 2.3.1, we estimate the distributions of
downtime durations. We use Gamma distributions. As a consequence, the downtimes are modeled as a
Gamma(1.79, 0.40) for the company and Gamma(1.21, 0.42) for the suppliers. Similarly, using the procedure
in Section 2.3.2 we estimate the proportion of lost customers based on a Beta distribution, leading to a
Beta(0.13, 1.74), shown in Figure 1.
We aggregate the previous costs and estimate the expected direct cost for the company as R = 517.16k EUR;
the expected cost induced by the suppliers as IR1 = 116.73k, IR2 = 103.38k EUR; and, finally, the total
expected cost as TR = 737.27k EUR. Note, again, that the first supplier seems worse as its entailed expected
loss is bigger.
The procedure described above would be run periodically, obtaining updated values for the probabilities and
costs. An example for T = 100 time steps is shown in Figure 2, where we plot the evolution of the attack
probability, the induced attack probabilities and the global attack probability. We can appreciate how, at
t = 0, we would prefer supplier 2 over 1, since it seems to induce less risk over the company. However, the
11
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Figure 1: Distributions of company downtime duration (left) and proportion of customers lost (right)
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Figure 2: Evolution of AP, IAP and GAP
probability induced by supplier 2 gets worse over time, reverting the situation. We also fit DLMs for the four
probability indices, as described in Section 2.5. This allows us to forecast the different attack probabilities
k-steps ahead. Figure 2 shows the expected value of the predictive distribution X100+k|D100 for k = 1, ..., 20,
and the corresponding 95% predictive intervals.
5 Discussion
As shown by the recent emergence of several products in the market, SCCRM is a very relevant and current
managerial problem given the increasing importance of cyber attacks and the interconnectivity of organisations
in modern economy and society. This motivated our approach to support SCCRM. Given the reluctance of
companies to release attack data, we have described how we may extract knowledge from security experts to
obtain the parameters required to assess risk scores, based on information coming from a TIS in relation with
attack vectors as well as the security posture and environment of a company and its suppliers. Besides, we
have incorporated forecasting models that allow us to monitor risk predictively and issue alarms. We may
also use the provided information to rank suppliers, negotiate SLAs or use them for insurance purposes. The
approach has been implemented in Python routines and integrated with a TIS.
There are several ways to further advance this work. For example, should data about attacks be revealed, we
could introduce schemes to learn about the involved parameters using our assessments as priors, through
Markov Chain Monte Carlo procedures, see e. g. French and Rios Insua (2000). We could also incorporate
additional impacts such as loss of productivity, loss of revenue or the increase of working hours. The model
might also consider collaboration among suppliers to mitigate consequences when a service is disrupted or
12
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monitoring information sharing between suppliers to avoid unfair competition. Finally, we have included only
direct suppliers to the company but we could also consider suppliers of suppliers, and beyond.
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